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Prof. Hafetz 
The United States and the Case for Humanitarian Intervention 
 Since the end of World War II, the established international community has had problems 
in dealing with humanitarian crises.  Although there have been notable successes, diplomacy has 
too often proven incapable of preventing or stopping the displacement, exploitation, and 
slaughter of innocent civilians that are trapped in conflict areas.  Even in the instances where 
diplomacy is eventually successful, countless lives are inevitably lost because of the delay 
between the beginning of diplomatic actions and the deployment of peacekeeping and/or 
humanitarian aid forces.  These lives are important.  In the best interests of a fair and just world 
steps need to be taken to ensure that these lives are looked after in the event that international 
diplomacy prove to be ineffective or too slow of a response. 
 It is the purpose of this paper to argue that argue that these lives can only be saved by a 
country which is free from enough of the barriers erected by the international community and 
their competing state interests to quickly and effectively respond to emerging humanitarian 
crises.  This country has to be able to act independently and without the logistical, financial, or 
military support of the various international bodies and alliances.  The United States is one such 
country.  The United States should make a firm, binding, commitment to responding to 
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humanitarian crises by adopting a responsibility to protect and also avoid placing itself in the 
position where international actors opposed to intervention can disrupt that response. 
 First, the international community can and has prevented atrocities but has been far from 
perfect in this pursuit.  In general, they should not be counted on to take all the steps necessary to 
effectively prevent atrocities.  There have been failures and at this time many of those failures 
have not resulted in effective change in the response to new humanitarian crises. 
Second, The United States was roundly criticized during the Bush Administration for 
failing to ratify the Rome Statute that would have made the United States a member of and 
subject to the International Criminal Court.  This paper will argue the alternative and address 
reasons why the United States is better able to perform in humanitarian efforts by not ratifying 
the statute. 
 The paper will also look to the issue of “lawfare”, which is the use of the legal system as 
a method of accomplishing a political or strategic objective, and how the United States can be 
subjected to its use by an opposing force as a tactic to block or delay humanitarian intervention. 
By ratifying the Rome Statute and engaging in humanitarian efforts that have not been fully 
sanctioned by the international community the United States would only expose itself to more 
barriers to immediate and effective action. 
 Finally, the paper will discuss how unsanctioned humanitarian efforts should be used, as 
a last resort, to intervene in situations where humanitarian intervention is critical to the 
preservation of human life.  The United States should adopt the “responsibility to protect” 
doctrine in order to give both notice to the international community how the United States stands 
in relation to humanitarian crises and to provide a serious deterrent to those in the world that 
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think they can commit atrocities with impunity because they have erected barriers to 
international action. 
The United States is the One of the Few Entities Capable of Providing Humanitarian 
Intervention in Most Conflict Areas 
 The role of intervening in humanitarian crises is one shouldered by the United States of 
America and few other countries who in one form or another have adopted the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention.  This is not due to any one single factor but a multitude of 
interlocking factors.  The first among these is the internal barriers within United Nations Security 
Council. 
I. The United Nations Ability to Act is Highly Limited 
 Security Council Issues 
 One of the greatest impediments to international intervention in humanitarian crisis is 
also the international body which is primarily tasked with providing for this humanitarian aid.  
The United Nations, through its charter, established the Security Council as its main force behind 
providing for the peace and stability throughout the world.
1
 
The United Nations intervenes in conflict areas only with the approval of the United 
Nations Security Council.
2
  The Security Council is primarily tasked with maintaining 
international peace and security
3
 and through the 2005 World Summit, preventing and 
                                                            
1
 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. 
2
 Id. ch. VII, art. 39-51. 
3
 Id. art. 24, para. 1. 
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intervening in genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
4
  The 
Council is made up of five permanent members and ten elected members that hold two year 
terms on the Council.
5
  Each of the permanent members of the Council has full veto power over 
any of the proposed Security Council resolutions.
6
  In order for a resolution to pass the resolution 
must receive at least nine affirmative votes and no negative votes from the permanent five.
7
 
The council’s makeup was proposed under the shadow of the failure of the League of 
Nations to prevent the Second World War and was aimed at preventing future world-wide 
conflicts and other serious conventional wars.
8
  To this end it was a resounding success and has 
likely averted many large scale conflicts, world wars, and helped to prevent further offensive 
uses of nuclear arms.
9
   
 Unfortunately, this setup generally prevents any intervention by the United Nations 
unless there is no conflict with any of the permanent member’s (United States, Great Britain, 
China, Russia, and France) state interests.
10
  This is particularly vexing considering the state 
interests and actions of some of the permanent members. These interests and actions cast a dark 
cloud of doubt over whether the U.N. Security Council could ever be fully depended on to make 
a call for action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
11
  Listed below are a just a few 
of the permanent five members whose interests would likely cause them to interfere with the 
passing of a resolution necessary for the intervention in a humanitarian crisis. 
                                                            
4
 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 139. 
5
 U.N. Charter art. 23 , paras. 1-2. 
6
 Id. art. 27. 
7
 Id. 
8
 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Report of the High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations 2004, 10. 
9
 Id. at 10-14. 
10
 U.N. Charter chapter V. 
11
 U.N. Charter chapter VII. 
5 
 
 The Russian Federation:  the Russian Federation has been a permanent Security 
Council member since shortly after the collapse of the U.S.S.R.
12
 which was an original 
permanent member.
13
  During that time they have been involved in a number of controversial 
actions which likely would have resulted in U.N. sanctions had they not possessed a veto power.  
Examples of these actions are: Russian aerial bombing during the War in Abkhazia in 1992-
1993
14
, the First Chechen War from December 1994 until August of 1996
15
, the Second Chechen 
War, that lasted from August 1999 until arguably April 2009 when Russian counter-insurgency 
efforts were officially halted
16
, the 2008 South Ossetia War
17
, and a number of other low 
intensity conflicts. 
 All of these incidents contain instances, sometimes entire campaigns, which involved the 
use of tactics, techniques, and procedures which ran afoul of basic human rights and the laws of 
war.  Examples include using attacking civilian directly
18
, unnecessary and excessive damage to 
the non-military infrastructure
19
, and use of non-discriminating munitions in population 
centers.
20
 
                                                            
12
 President of the Russian Federation, Letter to the Secretary-General from the President of the 
Russian Federation Dec. 24, 1991, U.N. Doc. 1991/RUSSIA, 1 (Dec. 24, 1991). 
13
 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. 
14
 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s fact-finding mission to investigate 
human rights violations in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, Nov. 17, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/26795 
(Nov. 17, 1993). 
15
 U.N. Secretary-General, The situation of human rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the 
Russian Federation, Mar. 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/13 (Mar. 26, 1996). 
16
 Human Rights Watch, “Who Will Tell Me What Happened to My Son?”, Human Rights Watch 
Sep. 27, 2009, at 3. 
17
 Human Rights Watch, Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in 
Conflict over South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch, January 2009, at 7, 89-122. 
18
 Id. at 115-122 
19
 Id. at 91-102 
20
 Id. at 103-113. 
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 In addition to these conflicts that the Russian Federation has been a part of, there are also 
a large number of instances where the Russian Federation has committed or has been suspected 
of committing human rights abuses within its own territory.
21
  Most of these instances revolve 
around the suppression of non-state media outlets
22
, pro-democracy non-governmental 
organizations
23
, and internal opposition parties.
24
 
 Further, the Russian Federation also has an unflattering record of arms sales to 
dictatorships and human rights violators.
25
  (Note: none of the Security Council members have a 
completely clean slate when it comes to arms trafficking)  This is especially true with the Syrian 
crisis that is currently unfolding.
26
   
 While the United Nations is sending two separate envoys to try and stem the tide of 
violence in Syria and establish a cease fire that would protect innocent civilians
27
 Russia is still 
sending in shipments into the country which the government of Syria is using to escalate the 
                                                            
21
 Human Rights Watch, An Uncivil Approach to Civil Society: Continuing State Curbs on 
Independent NGOs and Activists in Russia, Human Rights Watch, June 2009. 
22
 Birgit Beumers, Stephen C. Hutchings & Natalia Rulyova, The Post-Soviet Russian Media: 
Conflicting Signals, Routledge 2009. 
23
 Human Rights Watch, An Uncivil Approach to Civil Society, supra. 
24
 Id.  
25
 Amnesty International, Arm Transfers to the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for an 
Effective Arms Trade Treaty, Amnesty International 2009. 
26
 Id. 
27
 U.N. Secretary-General, Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General 
on Appointment of Joint Special Representative to Syria (Aug. 17 2012), 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6253. 
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violence.
28
  Shipments of arms have been seized on civilian passenger airplanes as they were 
heading over neutral countries and still Russia continues to send arms to Syria.
29
 
 That act sends two messages to the international community and to the Security Council.  
The first: Russia has no issue with a country engaging in violence against civilians.  The second: 
Russia will operate counter to the wishes of any international effort to stem violence if they can 
profit off of that violence. 
 Considering Russia’s human rights violations and arms profiteering, it is highly unlikely 
that they can be counted on to allow the United Nations Security Council to pass resolutions that 
intervene in humanitarian crises that involve conflicts.  It is even more unlikely that, if such a 
resolution would pass, Russia would commit any meaningful aid to support such an effort.  The 
Security Council is greatly limited with Russia’s permanent presence and cannot be counted on 
to intervene. 
The People’s Republic of China: The People’s Republic of China has, in the past decade, 
grown to become the world’s second largest economy by GDP.30  A not insignificant portion of 
this growth can be attributed to China’s willingness to commit to investment and development of 
infrastructure in countries whose human rights violations and rampant corruption have made 
them off limits to investment by much of the western powers.
31
  Some of these countries that 
                                                            
28
 Russia to honour arms sales contracts to Syria, The Telegraph (Jul. 11, 2012 2:33 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9392200/Russia-to-honour-arms-
sales-contracts-to-Syria.html  
29
 Turkey intercepts Syrian plane as tensions mount, USA Today (Oct. 10, 2012 7:23PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/10/turkey-syria-plane/1625763/ 
30
 China Overview, World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2012). 
31
 human rights first, Investing in Tragedy: China’s Money, Arms, and Politics in Sudan, human 
rights first, Mar. 2008  
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have received vast inflows of Chinese capital are Africa’s primary human rights violators 
(Sudan, Zambia).
32
 
 This involvement in Africa has influenced China in a way that it often opposes any 
substantive Security Council Resolution that has been attempted to intervene in these troubled 
areas of Africa and the rest of the world.
33
  An example of China using its veto power for its own 
purposes involve the vetoing of the extension of the mandate for U.N. Preventive Deployment 
force in Macedonia after that country had recognized diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese 
government.
34
 
 The only exception to this is the recent abstention from voting during the Libyan Civil 
War
35
, which allowed for no-fly zones to be enforced throughout the country.
36
 
 China’s stance of non-interference and its protection of its financial interests greatly limit 
the ability of the United Nations Security Council from responding to humanitarian crises in 
these countries.   
The United States:  The United States is itself not innocent of using the permanent member veto 
power to advance its own interests.  Loyalties to Israel
37
 have caused the United States to 
threaten Council Resolutions with its veto power many times among other reasons.
38
 
                                                            
32
 Id. 
33
 Id.  
34
 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate of United Nations 
Preventative Deployment Force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, U.N. Press Release 
SC/6648 (Feb 25. 1999). 
35
 Security Council, Security Council Approves “No-Fly Zone” over Libya, Authorizing “All 
Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians, by a Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. 
Doc. SC/10200 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
36
 Id. 
9 
 
Elected Members:  Another issue with relying on the United Nations Security Council for 
intervention in humanitarian crises is the unfortunate fact that many countries with abhorrent 
human rights records are given two year Security Council positions.
39
  These countries, whose 
duty on the Security Council the maintenance of international peace and security, can only be 
counted on to work in their self-interests and are unlikely to condemn the behavior of another 
country that is similar to its own. 
Failure to Enforce Resolutions 
 The United Nations Security Council also has a record of failing to enforce resolutions 
and to escalate measures against countries that willfully violate valid Security Council 
Resolutions. These failures can only be seen as emboldening countries to continue to ignore or 
violate Security Council resolutions in the future.  In order for there to be any deterrent effect, 
countries and groups that wish to commit atrocities have to believe there is at least a reasonable 
chance that their actions will provoke an international response.  When the international response 
never comes it shows the resolutions as failures.  
 Perhaps the greatest example of this failure is Iraq.  After the Gulf War and prior to the 
United States led invasion in 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued many resolutions 
relating to the Iraqi government.
40
  Many of these resolutions were ignored or willfully 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
37
 Sahar Okhovat, The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform, CPACS 
Working Paper No. 15/1 December 2011, at 13, 14. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Rep. of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, Dec. 15, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15 1999). Page 50. 
40
 Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq, U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq, 
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html, 2004. 
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disobeyed.
41
  In addition to this, there was endemic corruption with the United Nations 
supervised “Oil for Food” program42 and constant obstructionist behavior in disallowing the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct its mandated observation of Iraqi facilities.
43
 
 The steadfast refusal of France, Germany, and Russia to escalate the issue with Iraq likely 
removed any incentive for the Iraqi government to take seriously the U.N.’s diplomatic and legal 
efforts to ensure compliance with the resolutions.  This refusal prevented any type of non-regime 
change scenario from being attempted and likely erased any chances of the situation being 
resolved with minimal use of force. 
 To allow a nation to flaunt the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and to 
do so repeatedly can only reduce the chances of other nations respecting the Council and their 
resolutions.  The permanent members of the Security Council allowed this and international 
respect for the law suffered.  Without this respect for the law, how can we expect nations who 
wish to violate the law to be deterred by its eventual enforcement? 
 Without some type of systematic reform of how international interventions are authorized 
and international resolutions are enforced there are likely to be many future humanitarian crises 
that will slip past the international community without receiving its required attention.  
 The most unfortunate part of this is that the Security Council resolutions are only the first 
step that needs to be taken to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. 
                                                            
41
 Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme, Report on 
Programme Manipulation, Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-For-
Food Programme Oct 27, 2005. 
42
 Id. 
43
 International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions Relating to Iraq, GC(46)/RES/15 (Sep. 2002). 
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U.N. Peacekeepers 
 Even if a resolution to intervene in humanitarian crisis somehow makes its way past the 
significant hurdles of dealing with the United Nations Security Council another problem 
remains.  The peacekeeping forces sent by the United Nations typically lack the will, power, and 
freedom to accomplish tasks that go beyond mere observing, though there a certainly exceptions 
(Liberia
44
 and Sierra Leone).
45
 
 Glaring failures to protect at risk groups in Rwanda
46
 and Bosnia
47
 have shown that U.N. 
peacekeeping forces, the legally preferred group of much of the international community, cannot 
be relied upon to provide the necessary intervention needed by at risk groups. 
 In Rwanda, the U.N. peacekeeping force first stood by as the Hutu forces started their 
campaign of genocide.
48
  They then withdrew from the country as United Nations Security 
Council unanimously voted to order all but 270 of the UNAMIR troops to leave.
49
  In the 
ensuing diplomatic negotiations among the international community the Hutu forces slaughtered 
close to 800,000 ethnic Tutsi during the roughly one hundred days of the conflict.
50
  It was not 
                                                            
44
 U.N. Secretary-General, Final Rep. of the Secretary-General on the United Nations observer 
mission in Liberia, Sep. 12, 1997, U.N. Doc. S/1997/712 (Sep. 12, 1997). 
45
 U.N. Secretary-General, Eight Rep. of the Secretary-General on the United Nations observer 
mission in Sierra Leone, Sep. 28, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1003 (Sep. 28, 1999). 
46
 Rep. of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, Dec. 15, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257  (Dec. 15 1999). 
47
 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly 
resolution 53/35, Nov. 15, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999). 
48
 Rep. of the Independent Inquiry Rwanda, supra, at 15-19. 
49
 Id. at 19-22. 
50
 Id. at 3. 
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until the Tutsi forces from the RFP attacked and defeated the Hutu forces in Kigali that the 
slaughter stopped.
51
 
 In the conflict involving the former Yugoslavia states of Bosnia and Serbia, the United 
Nations Security Council passed a resolution in April of 1993 designating the area of Srebrenica 
as a U.N. enforced safe zone for the area’s ethnic Muslims.52  Muslim refugees flooded into the 
area to seek protection from the United Nations Protective Forces which in Srebrenica consisted 
of 400 Dutch troops.
53
  These troops stood by and watched as thousands of the male Muslims 
were systematically led away and slaughtered.
54
  They did not intervene to prevent the raping of 
women and the displacement of the entire population from that area.
55
  This failure led to the 
killing of thousands in Srebrenica.
56
 
 Much of these failures can be attributed to limited mandates for the peacekeeping roles 
that were assigned and the failure of the U.N. to ensure an adequate deployment of forces to 
respond to the threat posed in the crisis.
57
  These limited mandates are a byproduct of the 
diplomatic pressures and compromises that are needed to ensure a resolution can get past the 
veto threat of all five of the permanent members of the Security Council.
58
 
 In any future “hot” conflict, which is one that is quickly deteriorating, there has to be 
serious doubts about whether the United Nations will be able to perform its role in a way that 
                                                            
51
 Id. at 29. 
52
 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly 
resolution 53/35, Nov. 15, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/549, 14-18 (Nov. 15, 1999). 
53
 Id. at 44, 53. 
54
 Id. at 57-70. 
55
 Id. at 76-85. 
56
 Id. at 102. 
57
 Rep. of the Independent Inquiry Rwanda, supra, at 30-39. 
58
 Id. at 43-48, 50-52. 
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best protects the lives of innocent civilians using humanitarian intervention.  The United Nations 
is currently lacks a comprehensive plan to carry out such an operation without a clear mandate 
from the Security Council, which is both difficult to get and typically takes a great deal of time 
to procure; time which the victims in a humanitarian crisis may not have. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union 
 Aside from the United Nations, there are other entities that have made it their mission to 
intervene in humanitarian crises.  Both N.A.T.O.
59
 and the E.U.
60
 have attempted to establish the 
ability to have an effective presence in these scenarios especially after the failure of the U.N. to 
intervene and stop the mass killings in the former Yugoslavia.   
 The European Union however was effectively stonewalled by the same forces that 
prevented the United Nations from quickly and effectively responding to the crisis in Darfur.
61
  
The E.U. decided not to go as far as labeling the genocide there as atrocities which would have 
triggered the responsibility to act and therefore was able to sidestep any necessary actions on its 
part.
62
  Without that mandate to intervene the effort to stop the killings faltered.  It was not until 
many of the mass killings had been accomplished that a token force of African Union troops 
were able to respond to the scenario.
63
  That U.N. backed force lacked the necessary freedoms 
and mandate to effectively step in and stop the violence and much of the violence continued.
64
 
                                                            
59
 Gareth Evans, N.A.T.O. and the Responsibility to Protect, International Crisis Group (Mar. 31 
2009). 
60
 Oxfam International, The Responsibility to Protect and the European Union, Oxfam 
International (Mar. 2008). 
61
 Paul Kubicek and Dana Parke, European Union and Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, 
Darfur, and Beyond, EU External Affairs Review July 2011, at 64. 
62
 Responsibilty to Protect, supra, at 32-37. 
63
 Paul Kubicek and Dana Parke, European Union and Humanitarian Intervention, supra, at 64.
 
64
 Id. 
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 The message from this failure was clear.  The E.U. would respond to token missions that 
didn’t involve any real threat to their troops but would not engage themselves in a conflict that 
could result in E.U. casualties, even if vast amounts of civilians were in danger.
65
  The E.U. and 
its actors would also not face the threat of prosecution by entering into a sovereign nation 
without the blessing of the Security Council. 
 N.A.T.O. however has proven more willing to enter into conflicts.  The N.A.T.O. mission 
that provided air support and enforced no-fly zones in Libya was widely seen as a success for the 
alliance.
66
  This success is likely to be one of N.A.T.O.’s last, however. 
 Due to severe budgetary constraints that have been imposed during the recent global 
recession and the increased spending necessary to stabilize the social safety nets of their 
countries, many of the N.A.T.O. countries are not meeting their goals for force size and military 
spending.
67
  This has led some to call out N.A.T.O. as a dying organization, or in the words of 
the United States Secretary of Defense at the time, Robert Gates, a “paper tiger”.68 
 This drawdown of military forces is troubling as it is in addition to the force reduction 
measures that swept over N.A.T.O. after the fall of the U.S.S.R. and the dissolving of the 
Warsaw Pact.
69
  Unfortunately, some of the forces that remain can be either ill-equipped to deal 
                                                            
65 Id. at 66-67.
 
66
 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, The Crisis in Libya, International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 2012, available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya. 
67
 Clara Marina O’Donnell, The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest 
Members, Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (July 2011), at 6-9. 
68
 Associated Press, ‘Dim if not dismal future’: Gates blasts NATO, Associated Press, June 10, 
2011, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43351604/ns/world_news-europe/t/dim-if-not-
dismal-future-gates-blasts-nato/#.UMVZO4NZV2A. 
69
 Celeste A. Wallander, Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War, 
International Organization 54, 4, (Autumn 2000) 705-735, 718.  
15 
 
with humanitarian crises or are lacking in the professionalism necessary to accomplish the task.
 An unconfirmed example of this failure can be found in Afghanistan.  There, Italian 
troops had allegedly bribed the local Taliban fighters not to attack them and to leave the area in 
relative peace.
70
  The French forces that relieved the Italians were unaware of this arrangement 
and took many casualties as a result of being unprepared for the violence.
71
  
 N.A.T.O., barring any future changes that reinvigorate its military forces, is likely to 
continue its decline to a point where it may no longer have the ability to function as a serious 
international actor. 
 The bottom line, neither alliance can be counted on to effectively intervene in a 
humanitarian crisis.  This is not to disparage their good faith attempts to stop slaughter, but to 
recognize that they will not be able to respond in all instances.  This is critical because it is the 
position of this paper that every humanitarian crisis must be dealt with in order to prevent or stop 
atrocities.   
The United States’ Role 
 The United States will have to carry the burden of humanitarian intervention as it and 
only a limited amount of countries are prepared to do so unilaterally if the United Nations and 
the international alliances fail to step in to prevent or stop humanitarian crises.  That is not to say 
that, time permitting, all diplomatic avenues are taken that do not allow significant loss of life or 
any other atrocities to be committed while they are being pursued.  However, the United States 
                                                            
70
 Associated Foreign Press, French army denies reports of Italy paying bribes to Taliban, 
Associated Foreign Press (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.france24.com/en/20091016-
french-army-denies-reports-italy-paying-bribes-taliban. 
71
 Id. 
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must stand by this position for there to be any deterrent to the offending behavior in the 
international setting.  
 Perhaps most important is the swift action if the international community is unable to 
quickly come to a solution to prevent the continuation of atrocities.  Maintaining a benevolent 
and respected presence in diplomatic circles should be a less important goal than preventing or 
stopping mass killings, rapes, and destruction. 
 To accomplish this role the United States must be free from the greatly limiting rules of 
the International Criminal Court.  This is not to say the United States will be committing war 
crimes and needs to be free from judgment, but to realize that the same forces that may use 
loyalties with Security Council members to delay or prevent intervention by the United Nations, 
would very well use the I.C.C. as a means of hampering or preventing the United States from 
acting unilaterally to intervene, even if it is the only way to stop atrocities from being committed. 
II. Lawfare 
 Lawfare is a weapon designed to destroy the enemy by, using, misusing, and abusing the 
legal system and the media in order to raise a public outcry against the enemy.
72
 Lawfare is not 
always used in an improper manner, however, and has been used by many actors, including the 
United States, to accomplish certain objectives where military force is not a viable answer.
73
  It is 
                                                            
72
 Susan F. Tiefenbrun, Semiotic Definition of “Lawfare”, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. _, 1 
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1866448. 
73
 Orde Kittrie, Lawfare and U.S. National Security, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 393, 398-99 
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1779562. 
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also a means by which both state actors and non-state actors can bring legal action against state 
actors purely for the purpose of deterring them from achieving an objective.
74
 
 The Rome Statute, with its broad application to all members of a state party
75
, outlines 
many offenses that, while unlikely to lead to a conviction in the I.C.C., could effectively be used 
to stymie the actions of that state party that may be performing humanitarian efforts in good 
faith. 
Potential Charges Applicable to Military Humanitarian Intervention 
 Unfortunately there are a number of crimes outlined in the Rome Statute that would be 
applicable in today’s post-conventional warfare environment.  That environment includes a 
number of belligerents who are well aware of how to wage a powerful propaganda and 
psychological battle in the international realm.  
 In today’s post-cold war era, most entities that wish to commit atrocities know that if they 
are engaged in conventional combat by a superior force such as the United States or another 
N.A.T.O. force they are likely to take heavy losses.
76
  They therefore disperse their fighters 
amongst the unarmed population and often place major weapon emplacements near hospitals, 
schools, and other neutral structures so as to maximize collateral damage and to provide human 
shields for their operations.
77
  Spreading false reports about civilian casualties and damage is a 
                                                            
74
 Id. at 397. 
75
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, 13. 
76
 Dr. Carsten Bockstette, Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communications Management 
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mission for many of these forces who wish to weaken their opponent by siphoning of 
international and public support for intervention.
78
 
 A peacekeeping force in a humanitarian effort can be expected to be accused of 
committing war crimes which are outlined within Article 8 of the Rome Statute if they are facing 
a legally educated opponent.  Within the setting of an international armed conflict, which would 
necessarily be met in the case of humanitarian intervention, there are many opportunities by the 
enemy to set up the peacekeeping forces for a legal attack. 
 Article 8 (2)(b)(i) lists “Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population such 
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” as a war crime.79  This crime, 
while well intentioned, could easily be deemed to warrant an investigation by the I.C.C. without 
there actually being many or even any civilian casualties.  
 Most post-conventional fighters do not wear uniforms or insignias that distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.
80
  This does not fit into the requirements for lawful 
combatants under the Geneva Conventions.
81
 This approach presents many benefits to the 
fighters.  First, it allows them to blend in easily to the population which can make it much easier 
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to move freely.
82
  This freedom of movement allows the fighters to prepare ambushes, explosive 
devices, and perform battlefield exfiltration with much greater ease than a uniformed force.
83
  
Second, it makes the process of positively identifying a target much harder for the responding 
forces.
84
  Third, it greatly increases the chances of civilian casualties if in a heavily populated 
area.
85
 
 Perhaps one of the biggest problems with this for conventional troops is it makes positive 
target identification after combat much more difficult to differentiate from civilian casualties.  
This increases the ease in which, after being killed or disabled by opposing fire, friendly non-
conventional fighters can remove the implements and arms of war from the fallen and make 
them appear to be a non-fighting civilian.  One of the only defenses to this would be to 
individually test the hands of the fallen individuals with a solution to determine if any 
gunpowder residue is present.
86
  That practice, however, is extremely unlikely to occur given the 
operational tempo of the fight and the security dangers that would present themselves when a 
force would go out to perform this duty.
87
 
 A trained and intelligent enemy would be best served by attacking the peacekeeping 
forces while disguised as members of the local population, inflict as many peacekeeper fatalities 
as possible and then flee the scene while leaving behind their fallen comrades to appear as 
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civilians that got caught hit by peacekeeping forces.  Non-fighting members of this group would 
then simply have to make the claim there was no combat and that these civilians died as a result 
of barbaric activities by the peacekeeping forces.
88
  This can be especially damning if local 
government or religious leaders, for whom the population holds great trust in, are the ones 
making this claim.
89
 
Disruption of Military and Humanitarian Activities 
 What the defenders of the Rome Statute do not take notice of is that, while claiming that 
a fair trial is supposedly guaranteed, the mere initiation of a criminal investigation at the 
international level may be enough to achieve the actor’s goals of deterring or delaying a 
responding humanitarian intervention force. 
 One would hope that with all of the protections contained within the Rome Statute the 
chances of a United States citizen being charged and convicted of one of the enumerated 
offenses contained in Articles 6 through 8 is fairly low.  This, however, does not prevent the 
investigation, that it is the prosecutor’s duty to launch under Article 53, from greatly disrupting 
peacekeeping efforts.
90
 
 While defenders of the Rome Statute note, correctly, that a state party may avoid this 
investigation by the prosecutor if they open and perform their own full investigation
91
, what they 
do not discuss is the hindrances that this would place upon the humanitarian effort. 
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 Individual’s being investigated would more likely than not be temporarily relieved of 
their position as the investigation is performed.
92
  This relief from command could drastically 
alter the tempo of the peacekeeping efforts.  If forced to stop and change command elements 
after any major engagement, peacekeeping forces could be slowed to a point where they may not 
be able to quickly respond to instances of mass killings, rapes, and other destruction. 
 It is critical to remember that in Rwanda it only took 100 days for the Hutu rebels to kill 
as many as 800,000 people
93
; all of this with at least some United Nations force in the nation.
94
  
When it comes to rapidly evolving scenarios, even a mere hour’s time might result in the death 
of a great many people. 
Unsanctioned Humanitarian Efforts and Interventions 
 Much debate has occurred after the international community’s failure to stop the violence 
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
95
  This debate centered on what could be done to ensure 
that the international community would no longer sit idly by while atrocities were being 
committed.
96
  Out of this debate the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty published a report that put forward a new (or possibly old) way of looking at how 
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the international community deals with humanitarian crises.
97
  This idea was known as 
“responsibility to protect”. 
 Responsibility to protect, or R2P, takes a different approach to the standards in which 
humanitarian intervention is allowed and applied.
98
  First, instead of trying to determine the point 
in which a country commits enough atrocities to permit the breaching of its sovereignty, R2P 
presents that all countries have a duty to intervene and protect innocent civilians when the host 
country either lacks the power to act in their defense or is the cause of the crisis.
99
  This 
intervention is to be applied in the economic and political forms first, if feasible.
100
  Military 
intervention is to be used only as a last resort.
101
 
 The idea of responsibility to protect caught on with certain actors and was adopted by 
various countries and alliances such as the European Union
102
 and the African Union.
103
 
 However, there were countries that believed that R2P was a great threat to national 
sovereignty.
104
  These countries were: Algeria, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, the Russian 
Federation, and Venezuela.
105
  
 At the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations affirmed its commitment to the concept 
of R2P but made all interventions or actions subject to a United Nations Security Council vote.
106
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This condition meant that R2P, at least at the U.N., was not going to be observed unless the 
permanent five Security Council members were able to get past their usual biases and state 
interests for long enough to do the right thing.
107
 
 Without either the United Nations Security Council or the alliance or country 
acknowledging that there were atrocities being committed there would be no responsibility to 
protect. Without the responsibility there is no intervention under this doctrine.
108
 
 This was illustrated by the European Union and the United Nations reluctance to call 
what was happening in Darfur in 2004-2005 as anything to the level of atrocities.
109
  In fact, only 
one country in the permanent five actually recognized at the time that what was going on in 
Darfur was genocide, the United States.
110
  Unfortunately for the civilians who likely lost their 
lives as a result of the greatly delayed intervention, the United States does not strictly follow the 
principle of R2P.
111
 
 Looking forward, the United States must strictly adopt the principles of responsibility to 
protect.  As perhaps one of the few countries that can act both economically, politically, and 
militarily to prevent or halt atrocities from being committed, the United States owes a moral duty 
to intervene in humanitarian crises.    
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 The United States must bind itself to this responsibility.  This would do three things:  
first, it would ensure that humanitarian crises are responded to quickly, before many more live 
could be lost;  second, it would serve as a serious deterrent to the entities that wish to commit 
atrocities, knowing that they would certainly have to deal with consequences from their actions;  
third, it would allay much of the criticism from the international community that the United 
States was adopting this foreign policy doctrine solely as a ruse to allow it to enter sovereign 
nations to further its own self-interest.  
 This is also important as certain international bodies (the European Union) have 
manipulated their responsibility to protect in a way that they have avoided invoking their 
responsibility.
112
  Without being bound to act, internal political forces may apply enough 
pressure to the responsible parties to prevent them from fulfilling their duty under the established 
doctrine.  
Conclusion 
 Providing for aid and intervention in humanitarian crises is too much of a necessity for 
the preservation of innocent life for any humanitarian crisis to be ignored.  Affirmative actions 
need to be taken in order for those that cannot help themselves to be protected.  Speed and 
directness are essential elements for those actions to be successful. 
 The international community has so far not been able to establish a fail-proof method of 
dealing with these international crises in a way that successfully deters, prevents, or stops them 
from occurring.  While some type of reform may change how the international community deals 
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with these crises, for the moment they cannot be fully counted on to deal with all of the crises 
that may occur. 
 One of the actors in the world that has the capabilities to respond to these is the United 
States.  With the economic, logistical, and military capabilities to respond to almost any future 
humanitarian crisis (measured against all previous crises), the United States can now be one of 
the best actors in the event of a humanitarian crisis.  In order to maintain that position, they have 
to avoid being subjected to external forces that can act upon them to deter them from 
intervening, if necessary. One of the main things they need to avoid is ratifying the Rome Statute 
as it would likely lead their humanitarian forces to be subject to “lawfare”. 
 That lawfare could be used to interfere with the military operations in a way that U.S. 
military officials are relieved from their command and the operational tempo is reduced while 
the perpetrators of the atrocities are able to continue harming innocent civilians. 
 Finally, the United States has the moral obligation to adopt “responsibility to protect” and 
should do so in a way that it alleviates any concerns about improper motives for adopting it as 
well as binds the United States in a way that its responsibility cannot be avoided by making 
determinations that exempt it from its duty. 
 As one of the world’s last remaining super-powers the United States must start leading 
the cause of humanitarian intervention from the front and put that consideration parallel to its 
commitment to national self-defense.  Only then will the United States be worthy of the title that 
it gives itself, that of “leader of the free world”. 
  
